My first run (that I’m willing to talk about) of projections for the coming season is now up on the 2014 Projected Standings tab. They have also been used to create a new Playoff Chances Report. And, of course, the individual projections that go into are available, again on the Projected Standings page.

To build these projections, I:

1) Run a computerized projection scheme, using the last three years of player performance compared against a database of all players’ four year performances. The algorithm attempts to find the most similar players, in terms of age, position, build, and performance, and the top 20 players are noted on the individual player cards.

2) Take those performances, and enter them into a very large spreadsheet, where I fill in expected playing times for all of the players. Every team, every position has to equal 100%. There have to be 162 pitching starts. Generally speaking, a) no position player gets more than 90%, and pitchers are mostly capped at 32 starts; b) rookie starters don’t get more than 80%; c) players I don’t think can hold the job all year certainly get less; d) the playing time estimates from the computer tend to carry a lot of weight. I normally set a sure starter to the 5% playing time level that first passes their projected PA, while innings are usually held under the computer’s values.

All of the statistics in the spreadsheet get rebalanced and weighted. Players on teams with high OBAs will get more plate appearances. Defense trickles back into pitchers hits (and runs) allowed. The league as a whole has to come out equal to the league totals of last year.

Current free agents won’t show up here – no team, no projected playing time. Their projections are still available on the “All hitters” and “All pitchers” downloads.

Getting to some of the players takes a deep depth chart. I’ve prepared some that you can find under the 2014 Spring tab, under “dts”. Every team has three files in there. One is a dt file, which contains the translated statistics, 2009-13, with the computer-only 2014 projection, for all hitters in that team’s system; another is a pdt file, which does the same for pitchers. The “orgdt” file just has the 2014 projections for all players on the team, sorted by position and projected WARP, like the one here for the Nationals. Kind of works as a very deep depth chart for all teams, although I can’t swear that aren’t players showing up on the wrong team (especially for players who have been released – there’s a decent chance they still show up for their old teams). That’s just for these depth charts – I am reasonably certain that every player used in the major league projections is actually a member of their team. The one exception might be Matt Garza, who I have already written into the Milwaukee rotation.

Looking back on the Hall of Fame issues that came up, I think quite a few of the problems would disappear if they would just have a real election.

What, you say they already have one? No, they do not. Maybe I’m being overly pedantic, but an election, to me, is a way of choosing people to fill a position that must be filled. In particular, it has to result in a winner. The Hall of Fame selection process does not ensure a winner; it is more akin to the process of passing a piece of legislation than to the process of selecting a legislator.

The Baseball Hall of Fame has a pretty basic conflict. The Hall itself – and the community that founded it – desires, and needs, to have induction ceremonies held every July, and induction ceremonies without inductees is just bad for business. This argues for making voting easier, to ensure that we don’t have another repeat of 2013, when no one was selected.

On the other hand, they have given the keys of election to a group – the BBWAA – which seemingly takes more pride in denying entrance to the unworthy than welcoming the worthy. The procedures they have adopted also are intended to exclude all but the best.

Looking at things from a large, historical perspective, we see that major league baseball recognizes 2425 team-seasons in major league history – 1256 in the NL, 1048 in the AL, 85 in the 19th century American Association, 16 in the Federal League, 12 in the Union Association, and 8 in the Player’s League. Personally, I’d include all the teams in the National Association of 1871-75 as well, which would bump us up another 50, getting us to 2475.

There have also been 211 players elected to the Hall of Fame – not counting managers and Negro League players. I’d also include a few players from the NA days who were inducted as “pioneers”, but whose playing career demonstrates at least some worthiness (George Wright and Al Spalding for sure; Candy Cummings is more questionable). I’d also add to the list of players some obvious selections (based on their play) who have been denied entrance for moral failings of one kind or another – let us say Joe Jackson, Pete Rose, Mark McGwire, Barry Bonds, Sammy Sosa, and Roger Clemens. That is 220 players, 2475 teams, or a player for every 11.25 teams in history.

That was the most expansive definition. If I wanted to be stricter, I could just look at the 211 players selected to the Hall. And I could throw out the NA teams, and all the third leagues, and probably the first three years of the AA, when it’s quality level was way, way below the NL of the day. That produces a narrower list of 2358 teams. Ratios vary from 10.72 (using the largest number of players and smallest number of teams) to 11.73 (the reverse). To be less precise – there’s been a Hall of Fame player selected for every 11 or 12 teams in history.

Since there are currently 30 teams playing in the majors every year, it means that if you simply accepted the existing ratio as a guide, then we should be creating around 2.5 new Hall of Famers every year just to keep up.

So my proposal to the Hall of Fame committee is this – make it a real election. The top vote getter each year gets in, regardless of the vote count. The second-place finisher gets in, assuming a 50%+1 approval. The third (or more) person goes in if they can pull a 75% approval.

In all of Hall voting, there have only been two players who have finished first or second in the voting without currently being in the Hall of Fame – Craig Biggio (1st in 2013, and near-certain to crack the threshold at some later date) and Jack Morris (who finished 2nd in 2013). Even in third, there’s only a few cases – Jeff Bagwell in 2012-13, Tony Oliva in 1988, and Gil Hodges four times in the 70s. I don’t think the Hall would be in any way diminished by these inclusions.

How would the last 25 years elections have worked following my rules? I’m going to make the naive assumption that votes for other players would not have changed due to players that I’ve removed from the ballot by inducting them before their time.

1990 – Real inductees Jim Palmer and Joe Morgan are selected.

1991 – Real inductees Rod Carew, Gaylord Perry, and Fergie Jenkins.

1992 – Tom Seaver and Rollie Fingers are selected.

1993 – Reggie Jackson selected by the Hall, and then we have our first change. Phil Niekro finished second with 65.7% of the vote, and we put him in now rather than making him wait until 1997.

1994 – The real Hall tabs Steve Carlton, and we concur. But we will also honor Orlando Cepeda, who picked up 73.5% while finishing second, and won’t make him wait until a Veterans Committee meeting in 1999.

1995 – Mike Schmidt is selected. Phil Niekro was second, but we already have him, which means the “second-place” finisher was Don Sutton. 57% puts him in the Hall now instead of 1998.

1996 – No one is elected by the real Hall. Niekro was first, so we skip him; that makes Tony Perez #1, so in he goes without waiting four more years. Sutton is next, skip him, and that brings up Steve Garvey…but he only has 37% vote. Perez is our only inductee this year.

1997 – The real Hall chose Niekro, followed by Sutton and Perez, all of whom we’ve already honored. The top recipient, and our winner, even though he only had 39% of the vote, is Ron Santo. We salute him in 1997, instead of making him wait until the afterlife (died 2010, inducted to Hall in 2012).

1998 – The Hall selected Don Sutton. We skip him, and then skip Perez, and Santo, and then its welcome to the Hall of Fame, Jim Rice. We’re already under 50%, so he’s all alone, but he doesn’t have to wait another decade until 2009.

1999 – The Hall has a strong first-year class, and names Nolan Ryan, George Brett, and Robin Yount. We don’t have to change a thing.

2000 – Carlton Fisk is selected by the Hall, and we’re fine with that. Perez and Rice were next, and we already have them; our second place finisher is Gary Carter, but he is just under 50% and so will have to wait.

2001 – The Hall gives Dave Winfield and Kirby Puckett over 75%, so they are in.

2002 – Ozzie Smith is really elected. Gary Carter is second, and now has over 50% of the vote, so he gets in a year earlier than reality.

2003 – Eddie Murray finished first, and was genuinely elected, and Carter was also elected. Since we already have Carter in, our second-place finisher is Bruce Sutter, who qualifies with 54% approval. In three years early.

2004 – The real Hall names Paul Molitor and Dennis Eckersley.

2005 – The real Hall names Wade Boggs and Ryne Sandberg.

2006 – Sutter was the only real inductee that year. Ignoring him, and second-place finisher Rice, our top recipient is Rich Gossage. And our second place finisher is Andre Dawson, and 61% makes him a qualifying second-placer. Gossage goes in for us now instead of 2008, and Dawson moves up from 2010.

2007 – The Hall really does name two, Cal Ripken and Tony Gwynn, so our work is unneeded.

2008 – Gossage was the Hall’s real choice. We’re going to go past him, and Rice, and Dawson, and find ourselves a nice shiny Bert Blyleven. The next finisher would be Lee Smith, but he’s under 50%; so Bert has the podium to himself now instead of waiting until 2011.

2009 – Rickey Henderson is taken in reality, as was Jim Rice. Our second place finisher (after skipping Rice, Dawson, and Blyleven) would again be Lee Smith, but again he’s under 50% and is not inducted.

2010 – Reality elects Dawson, but we’ve had him in for four years already. Next was Blyleven, also in already. Our top finisher in 2010 is Roberto Alomar, so he goes in a year ahead of time. Our second place finisher is Jack Morris, and he does receive 50% of the vote, so he goes in, too. Morris is the first person we’ve inducted who has not made the actual Hall. However, like Cepeda and Santo, similarly rejected by the BBWAA, he’s a near-cinch for a future Veteran’s Committee.

2011 – Reality selected Alomar and Blyleven, but we have beaten reality to the punch. Barry Larkin is our inductee. Morris would have gotten in again, but skipping over him means that, for the third time, our second place finisher is Lee Smith. And for the third time, he is under 50%.

2012 – The Hall really chose Larkin; we’ll ignore him, and then ignore Morris. Our number 1 becomes Jeff Bagwell. Our number two, again, is Lee Smith; but this time he picked up 50.6% of the vote. He’s in!

2013 – No one was selected by the BBWAA this year. Craig Biggio was on top the list, though, so he is in. We can ignore Morris, and Bagwell in third, to get down to Mike Piazza. He’s our second-place man, and he’s got 58% support, so in he goes.

2014 – Just as in real life, Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine, and Frank Thomas.

So to summarize – this way guarantees that there will be someone to honor at Cooperstown each year. Players who aren’t selected in their first year tend to get in a couple of years earlier this way. Virtually all players who meet our rules but not the BBWAA 75% rule eventually get named to the Hall anyway. We’d have saved Orlando Cepeda and Ron Santo from the Veteran’s Committee. We would have inducted Jack Morris and Lee Smith, who have (definitely, probably) missed out from the BBWAA. We’ve already gotten to Bagwell, Biggio, and Piazza, who should all be eventual winners.

Clay

The matchups:

                      246/234   250/244   263/239   253/230
                      Colon(R)  Gray(R)  Parker(R)  Straily(R)
Avila (L)    154/270    255      260       273        263
Fielder (L)  284/282    267      271       285        274
Infante (R)  279/273    246      256       251        242
Cabrera (R)  388/343    309      322       315        303
Iglesias (R) 245/251    226      236       231        222
Dirks (L)    225/250    237      240       253        243
Jackson (R)  240/273    246      256       251        242
Hunter (R)   283/270    243      253       248        239
Martinez (B) 254/284    269      273       287        276

Net Tigers             .2569    .2647     .2677      .2576

                        227/171      237/265     245/200    242/260
                       Scherzer(R) Verlander(R) Sanchez(R) Fister(R)
Vogt(L)      263/290     253          264          273       270
Barton(L)    251/294     257          268          277       274
Sogard(L)    254/252     220          230          237       235
Donaldson(R) 358/296     195          302          228       296
Lowrie(B)    283/287     251          262          270       287
Cespedes(R)  303/241     159          246          185       241
Crisp(B)     245/307     268          280          289       307
Reddick(L)   245/264     230          241          249       246
Moss(L)      230/313     273          285          295       291

Net A's                 .2378        .2655        .2590     .2735

A very even series, with no team having a 60% or better chance in any game.

Game 1, Scherzer v Colon – Tigers 59.5%
Game 2, Verlander v Gray – A’s 50.4%
Game 3, Sanchez v Parker – Tigers 54.1%
Game 4, Fister v Straily – A’s 57.4%
Game 5, Scherzer v Colon – Tigers 59.5%

The total series leans to the Tigers, 55.7%

Here’s how their hitters and pitchers matched up:

Red Sox
                          228/255     171/254   245/226   278/272  
                           Moore(L)  Price(L)   Cobb(R)  Hellickson(R)
Saltalamacchia(B) 229/299                         282      320
Napoli (R)     302/283      296        295        246      296
Pedroia (R)    327/261      321        319        227      273
Middlebrooks(R)274/230      269        268        200      241
Drew (L)       205/304      180        135        286      325
Gomes (R)      277/265      272        271
Ellsbury (L)   245/308      215        161        290      329
Victorino(B)   299/270      293        292        254      289
Ortiz (L)      258/357      226        170        336      282
Ross(R)        273/203      268        267
Nava(B)        236/311                            293      333

Net Sox                     .2650     .2538      .2723    .3008                  

                           231/252     240/265   188/203     252/227
                          Lester(L)   Lackey(R) Buchholz(R)  Peavy(R)
Lobaton(B)   240/266                    246                    258
Loney(L)     265/287        235         265        208         278
Zobrist(B)   241/296        234         273        214         287
Longoria(R)  329/282        319         287        220         246
Escobar(R)   277/248        268         253        194         217
Rodriguez(R) 267/196        259
Jennings(R)  305/259        296         264        202         226
Myers(R)     308/286        299         292        223         250
Young(R)     266/262        258         267        205         229
Molina(R)    234/213        227                    166
DeJesus(L)   111/282                    260        204         273

Net Rays                    .2687       .2680      .2049      .2532

The matchups give the Rays a narrow advantage in three of five games, but the Red Sox advantage in the remaining two is so large that they get the benefit of the overall chances.

Game 1, Lester v Moore – Rays 51.7%
Game 2, Lackey v Price – Rays 56.8%
Game 3, Buchholz v Cobb – Red Sox 80.6%
Game 4, Peavy v Hellickson – Red Sox 70.3%
Game 5, Lester v Moore – Rays 51.7%

That works out to an expected Red Sox series victory 65.53% of the time.

Here’s how their hitters and pitchers matched up:

                           174/199     271/213    276/238    264/245
                          Kershaw(L)  Greinke(R)  Ryu(L)    Nolasco(R)
McCann (L)   227/307       152          320        241       312
Freeman(L)   285/339       191          353        303       344
EJohnson(B)  216/211       165          220        198       214
CJohnson(R)  338/280       259          229        309       264
Simmons(R)   253/254       194          208        232       239
Gattis(R)    285/268       218          220        261       253
Upton(R)     172/231       132          189        157       218
Heyward(L)   288/279       193          291        306       283

Net Braves                .1863        .2519      .2478     .2595  

                           267/249    211/246    294/219     303/240
                          Medlen(R)   Minor(L)  Teheran(R)  Garcia(R)
AEllis(R)     261/259       248         247       218         239
Gonzalez(L)   278/304       312         226       344         354
MEllis(R)     279/251       240         264       211         232
Ramirez(R)    387/353       338         366       297         326
Uribe(R)      285/289       277         270       243         267
Crawford(L)   205/300       308         166       339         350
Schumacher(L) 241/259       266         196       293         302
Puig(R)       336/320       306         318       270         295

Net Dodgers                 .2772      .2558      .2709      .2875

The matchups give the Dodgers an advantage, not just in every game, but in every permutation of matchups except a Minor vs Nolasco battle.

Game 1, Kershaw v Medlen – Dodgers 87.9%
Game 2, Greinke v Minor – Dodgers 51.9%
Game 3, Ryu v Teheran – Dodgers 61.0%
Game 4, Nolasco v Garcia – Dodgers 62.5%
Game 5, Kershaw v Medlen – Dodgers 87.9%

That works out to an expected Dodger series victory 85.45% of the time.

Matchup eqas, based on both the hitters and pitchers splits:

              Wainwright Lynn   Kelly  Miller
Martin          248      256     277     243
Morneau         264      321     286     310
Walker          270      328     291     316
Mercer          220      227     246     216
Alvarez         270      328     291     316
Marte           244      252     273     240
McCutcheon      287      297     322     283
Byrd            263      272     294     259

Net            .2377   .2646   .2644   .2537 (includes a .100 pitcher)

                Burnett Cole Liriano Morton
Carpenter        361    312    167     413
Beltran          344    297    267     394
Holliday         268    303    311     256
Adams            342    295    130     391
Molina           246    278    323     235
Jay              310    268    134     355
Freese           218    247    303     208
Descalso         277    239    111     317

Net              2886  2599   2314    2966

Game 1: The Cardinals, behind Wainwright, are a huge favorite over Burnett and the Pirates in game 1. He’s got a huge lefty split, and the Cards will throw 5 against him (counting Beltran). A .2886-.2377 eqa margin equates to a 72.5% win percentage for the Cards.

Game 2: Lynn vs Cole: This time it is the Cardinal pitcher who has a big platoon split, but the Pirates can only send 3 lefties up to the plate (unless they choose to send Jones up over Marte). It makes for what should be the evenest matchup of the series; the Pirates have a .2646-.2599 eqa advantage, which comes out to a 52.2% chance for the Pirates to win game 2.

Game 3: All those lefties spell trouble for the Cards in game 3, as they have to face Francisco Liriano and his extraordinary lefty-killing splits. Meanwhile, Kelly offers the Cardinals nothing special. Its a .2644-.2314, Pirates, and that makes a 66.1% win chance for the Pirates.

Game 4: But all those Cardinal lefties come back in game 4, because Morton has even worse splits than Burnett. The Cardinals against Charlie stack up as a .2966 eqa, against the .2537 the Pirates manage against Shelby Miller. If it is Miller – Wacha’s numbers would come through as better than Miller’s, so the odds would only go up from the 68.6% in the Cardinal favor.

Game 5 figures to repeat game 1. <Edit: Ah, the Pirates swict to Cole for game 5. That makes it a much tighter .2599-.2377 Cardinal advantage, 61% instead of 73%…without taking into account the rest advantage for the Cardinals.>

Stick those percentages in with a random number generator, and the Cardinals are projected to win the series 67.6958% of the time.

And, with game 1 in the books and a 9-1 win, the Cardinals are up 78% to win the series.

Same setup as with the Reds/Pirates yesterday.

Danny Salazar goes 225 v left, 253 v right, and is RH.

Molina (R) 214 v RH, Salazar 253, net .208
Loney (L) 285 v 225 = 247
Zobrist (B) 295 v 225 = 255
Escobar (R) 252 v 253 = 245
Longoria (R) 281 v 253 = 273
DeJesus (L) 282 v 225 = 244
Jennings (R) 255 v 253 = 248
Myers (R) 291 v 253 = 283
Young (R) 259 v 253 = 252

Team total, .2505. Myers and Longoria are the strengths, Molina the notable weak link.

For the Indians, against Alex Cobb. Cobb is also right-handed, with a 245/226 left/right split.

Gomes (R) 272 v 226 = 236
Santana (B) 293 v 245 = 276
Kipnis (L) 291 v 245 = 274
Cabrera (B) 261 v 245 = 246
Aviles (R) 247 v 226 = 215
Brantley (L) 272 v 245 = 256
Bourn (L) 250 v 245 = 236
Swisher (B) 249 v 245 = 235
Giambi (L) 243 v 245 = 229

Team total, .2459.

[Late edit: so it seems it will Chisenhall at third instead of Aviles; he gets 252 v 245 = 237, Likewise, Raburn will play RF, pushing Swisher to 1B, Santana to DH, and iambi to the bench. So, effectively, Raburn (282 v 226 = 245) instead of Giambi. That changes the team total to .2490, which gives the Rays a .508 chance – prior to home field advantage.]

That difference spells a narrow Rays advantage, about a .523 win percentage.

Which I used as my title. However…

I haven’t accounted for home field, which should amount to about +.020 for Cleveland and -.020 for the Rays, which puts us at .503-.497 for the Rays. Nor have I accounted for (or, frankly, have any idea how to quantify) fatigue, as the Rays have been bouncing around the eastern half of North America while the Indians stayed home.

A very quick look at the Reds/Pirates game tonight.

Reds starter Johnny Cueto, this season, had a .207 eqa against left-handed hitters and a .234 eqa against righties. He is himself a RH.

Russell Martin, the Pirates catcher, is right-handed, and hit for a .275 eqa against right-handed pitchers.

Now, if a hitter with a .275 eqa goes against a pitcher who allows a .234 eqa, the expected eqa of the result should be roughly (275*234 / 260), or .248. This value is consistent with converting each of the eqas into winning percentages, letting them go head to head with the log5 method, and converting back into an eqa.

Repeating for the whole Pirate roster

C   Martin (R)      .275v234  =  .248

1b Morneau (L)     .297v207 = .236

2B Walker (S)      .296v207 = .236

SS Mercer (R)       .247×234 = .222

3B Alvarez(L)      .299v.207 = .238

LF Marte (R)        .278v234 = .250

CF McCutcheon (R)  .322v234 = .290

RF Byrd (R)         .291v234 = .262

The average value, for the whole Pirate team, is .249; eqas don’t sum linearly, they sum by the 2.5 power. That’s not a big deal here (a straight mean is .248), but will be for the opposite calculation.

Doing the same thing for the Reds against Francisco Liriano is trickier, because his EQA against lefties is so low as to be below zero. The eqa is low enough that a lineup of average hitters would be better off without that hitter in it, even if they got fewer chances as a result. Using an alternate form of the eqr equation, one that can’t go sub-zero, yields an eqa of .132. Against righties , he’s got a decidedly pedestrian .265 eqa allowed.

C Hanigan (R)    225v265 = 229

1b Votto (L)     303v132 = 154

2b Phillips (R)    271v265 = 276

SS Cozart (R)     245v265 = 250

3B Frazier (R)     278v265 = 283

LF Ludwick (R)   278v265 = 283

CF Choo (L)       243v132 = 123

RF Bruce (L)       262v132 = 133

The average value here works out to a .230 eqa when using the 2.5 power rule, quite a bit higher than the .216 you’d get from a straight average.

The win chance of a .249 eqa team (the Pirates) against a .230 team (the Reds) is .598.

Extending this into bullpens would probably only help the Pirates more. They had a composite .240 eqa from their bullpen in 2013, compared to the Reds .245; their likely top 4 dominate the Reds top 4, in a game theory sense:

Melancon 190 v Chapman 207
Watson 207 v Hoover 231
Wilson 217 v LeCure 232
Grilli 225 v Simon 225

One of the things I do every day is the download from MLB for new players, both new to the majors and to the minors.

This guy showed up as new this morning:

639238,2013,”Arredondo, Edgar”,”Arredondo”,”Edgar”,””,”Edgar”,””,569,”TIG”,11,”OOC”,”1″,”47″,””,”R”,”R”,75,192,1997/04/16,”Culiacan Sinaloa, Mexico”,””,”-“,”-“,””,”-“,”-“,”-”

Without going through all the codes, this Edgar Arredondo has joined the Tigres of the Mexican League, who used to be in Mexico City years ago but have re-established themselves in Cancun (state of Quintana Roo) on the Yucatan coast. The big deal is the birthdate: 4/16/1997. If that’s accurate, it makes him easily the first 1997 player in my database.

And he was the Tigre’s starting pitcher of the night, going two scoreless innings (one hit, one walk). And I do find articles from last year with him pitching in the 15-under world championships, so yes, I’d say this guy’s legit.

In case you couldn’t tell, I have been back home for several days (perfect recovery no, but the trajectory is upwards) and the updates have been going out.

And I think I may have, finally, tracked down all the stupid errors in my software that came from Houston being in the American League now. We’ll see if all the pages load tomorrow like they are supposed to.